The sequential bargaining approach uses empirical data on party preferences and legislative seat shares. It estimates predicted probabilities � that portfolio (1 ≤ ≤ ) is allocated to party (1 ≤ ≤ ) using mechanism . Using these predicted probabilities we obtain three empirical outcomes of interest: i) predictive success, ii) predictive accuracy, and iii) the associated weighting parameters α i . This appendix describes in greater detail the algorithm to
obtain these estimates. To simplify the discussion and to avoid further subscripts, the description is based on a single cabinet with cabinet parties and portfolios.
Step 1: Create preference-matrices The first step is to compute government parties' payoffs from holding individual cabinet positions. Party ′ preferences for portfolios 1 to can be summarized using a vector
where captures the objective importance of holding portfolio , indicates party ' emphasis on policy issues related to portfolio while the relative importance of ministry-and party-specific preferences is indicated by the weighting factor .
To incorporate the uncertainty in measures for the parties' portfolio preferences and , we perceive party ′ preferences as random variables. For the simulation of the sequential allocation process, we take 1,000 draws and each draw represents a slightly different combination of party preferences for the individual portfolios. We simulate the variation in experts' average judgments using 1,000 random draws from a −distribution with − 1 degrees of freedom and mean , standard deviation , and the number of experts as reported in the expert surveys (Druckman & Roberts 2008; Druckman & Warwick 2005) .
For the party-specific value for each cabinet position, , the uncertainty estimates are retrieved using the approach suggested by Benoit et al. (2009) . This is done by matching policy areas to ministerial portfolios following Bäck et al. (2011: 454-455) . For all ministerial portfolios not included in their analysis we mimic their approach to identify policy categories that match with the respective ministerial responsibilities. As suggested by Benoit et al.
(2009), we estimate bootstrapped standard errors for manifestos with statements by simulating 1,000 artificial manifestos, each based on draws from a multinomial distribution with probabilities (for more information see Benoit et al. 2009 ).
This simulation procedure results in a 1,000 × matrix with 1,000 slightly different estimates for party ′ preferences for portfolios 1 to
where each row (i.e. random draw) represents a slightly different configuration of party ′ preferences for portfolios 1 to .
Step 2: Obtain individual choice sequence for each sequential mechanism
The second step is to obtain the individual choice sequence for each sequential mechanism (the mechanisms are described in more detail in the main text). Based on the cabinet parties' seat share in the legislature's lower chamber, we obtain a row vector which specifies the choice sequence among cabinet parties with elements (i.e. portfolios) for each sequential mechanism :
It may happen that the different mechanisms result in two or more parties being assigned the next pick in the choice sequence (see also endnote 7). This is most obvious for Step 3: Estimate predicted probabilities and predictive success
In a third step, information on the cabinet parties' preference matrices is matched with the choice sequence of each mechanism . For a given combination of and a pre-defined choice sequence , cabinet parties choose their most-preferred of the remaining cabinet positions until all portfolios are distributed among them. Thus, for each of the 1,000 simulated preference distributions we obtain a prediction whether party obtains portfolio using mechanism (1) or not (0). Predicted probabilities � are simply the averages of these predictions over 1,000 simulations. We define 'correct predictions' as those where the cabinet party with the highest predicted probability � is identical to the empirically observed allocation. For each mechanism we thus obtain the share of correctly predicted cabinet positions.
Step 4: Estimate weighting parameters
In order to identify the parameters , we repeat the simulation process for each allocation mechanism k for all possible combinations of , ranging from 0 to 1 using 0.1 intervals.
There are 11 possible combinations, ranging from 121 for two-party governments up to 161,051 possible combinations for coalition governments with five parties. For each combination, we re-run the sequential allocation approach in order to identify the combination of parameters with the highest predictive success. If this procedure results in more than one optimal combination of party-specific weighting parameters , we take the average .
However, these instances are rare (see endnote 12) and the differences between combinations of optimal s are rather small: the average Euclidean distances between optimal vectors in the −dimensional space ranges from 0.03 (Alternation) to 0.06 (D'Hondt).
Choice sets for parameters are restricted for computational reasons, as more fine- varies considerably between 69 and 86 percent for different combinations of . Second, the maximum share of correctly predicted portfolios is obtained for 0 < < 1 ( = 0.6 = 0.9). This suggests that cabinet parties have mixed motives and that they are neither exclusively driven by portfolio importance nor by their policy-issue emphasis. Third, the maximum share of correctly predicted portfolios is obtained for > 0.5 ( = 0.6 = 0.9), indicating that objective portfolio importance generally trumps partyspecific policy preferences when it comes to allocating cabinet positions.
In the empirical section we compare the results of the sequential approach with a naïve model assuming mutual independence in the allocation of individual cabinet positions. The first column in Appendix Table 1 reports the detailed results of the conditional logit model. Here, the allocation of each portfolio is the unit of analysis while each cabinet party is conceptualized as the choice alternative. As expected both party seat share and party preferences exert a positive and significant effect on the likelihood that a party controls a given portfolio. The second and third columns in Appendix Table 1 present the results of the mixed logit model, which relaxes the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption by allowing the model parameters to be randomly distributed. Similar to the conditional logit model the mean coefficients indicate that party seat share and party preferences continue to exert a positive and significant effect on the allocation of individual portfolios. At the same time, we find no significant variance for either coefficient while the likelihood-ratio test likewise suggests that
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